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Feasibility of the Income Stabilisation Tool in Finland
Liesivaara P., Myyrä S. and Jaakkola A.
Abstract
Whole-farm income insurances are promoted in the new post-2013 Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP). The current Crop Damage Compensation (CDC) scheme in Finland covers crop failure
for farmers who have suffered losses and applied for the payments. This paper analyses the use
of the Income Stabilisation Tool (IST) and compares it to the current CDC scheme in Finland.
The Finnish Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) is used to simulate the costs of IST
compensation payments. Special attention is paid to pig farms and their possibilities to
manipulate the IST. Results show that the IST is triggered with a high frequency on Finnish
farms. The IST would be more costly than the current CDC programme. The results also
suggest that the IST would act as an income transfer policy if farmers could influence their
annual income. However, the efficiency of the IST as an income transfer policy is questionable
due to its large transaction cost.
Keywords: Income stabilization tool, moral hazard, Farm Accountancy Data Network
JEL classification:Q14
1. INTRODUCTION
Farmers can use a number of formal and informal tools to guard against and overcome
variability in farm incomes. Informal tools such as savings, land improvements, drainage
systems and irrigation systems are needed not only to smooth income variability but also to
increase productivity in agriculture. Another example of a set of informal tools is the timing of
purchases of inputs and sales of outputs. Informal tools are widely used by farmers, and formal
tools, weather insurances, price hedging products or income stabilization tools should not
override farmers’ own informal actions to guard against and overcome variability in farm
income. Despite the existing tools that farmers can already use, high volatility in agricultural
commodity prices has increased the interest in implementing a new tool to reduce the variability
in farmers’ incomes. The pig husbandry sector, in particular, has suffered from high volatility in
pig meat as well as grain prices. Thus, pig husbandry data provide a good starting point to
examine how pig farmers would adopt a formal risk management tool and what their informal
actions would be within given economic boundaries using such a tool.
Finland is the northernmost member of the EU, where agricultural production is operated
under extreme climatic conditions. The harsh climate and northern location causes high
variability in crop yields and commodity prices. Weather inconstancies and small markets
combined with asymmetric information have not created incentives to develop private crop
insurance schemes in Finland (Myyrä and Pietola, 2011; Myyrä et al., 2011; Pietola et al.,
2011). Moreover, the current Crop Damage Compensation (CDC) scheme is administered and
fully financed by the government. Thus, no formal yield or income insurances provided by
private insurance companies exist in Finland. The CDC scheme covers crop failures for farmers
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who have suffered losses and applied for the payments. However, the CDC scheme has been
shown to suffer from serious moral hazard problems (Myyrä and Pietola, 2011). Increased
variability in agricultural commodity prices as well as a new option within the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) has raised interest in constructing more efficient risk management
tools for Finnish farmers. The CAP may provide a new tool to tackle income variability in the
Finnish farming sector. However, some serious drawbacks could be involved and the outcome
from these tools might be the opposite of their original purpose.
The CAP is due to be reformed in 2013. On 12 September 2011 the European
Commission released seven legislative proposals revealing the structure of the CAP for the
period 2014–2020. New risk and crisis management instruments are to be introduced as part of
the proposal on support for rural development, also known as the second pillar of the CAP (EC,
2011). More specifically, whole-farm income insurances are to be promoted in the new policy
as an Income Stabilization Tool (IST), and this tool will be available for all EU member states.
Before any new risk management programmes are implemented, it is important to
describe the needs and research the possible effects of the IST in Finland. Subsidized formal
risk management tools may function as a tool for transferring wealth from taxpayers to farmers
and impede active risk management on the farm level. Several studies have suggested that
different crop insurance schemes and disaster relief programmes increase farm incomes.
Goodwin and Rejesus (2008) noted that farmers who purchase crop insurance in the U.S. appear
to be more profitable. The result suggest that farmers who take out insurance and are in areas
with greater disaster assistance are better farm managers, or that disaster relief and crop
insurance payments are a form of wealth transfer to the farmers. Schaufele et al. (2010) reported
that the Canadian AgriStability programme, which is similar to that introduced in the CAP 2013
reform, is highly subsidized. They demonstrated that when there is a catastrophic price risk, it is
profitable for Canadian cow-calf producers to participate in the AgriStability programme,
despite the risk their farms face. This means that programme enrolment fees are disconnected
from the actual risk that a farm confronts.
This paper analyses the use of the IST and compares it to the current CDC scheme in
Finland. Another objective of this paper is to analyse whether the IST programme would
function as a form of wealth transfer instead of an income stabilization tool for farmers. In
particular, the most efficiently managed farms confronted with an adjustment capacity could
manipulate the IST by amplifying income waivers with informal risk management tools. This
effect is analysed in the Finnish the pig husbandry sector. The Finnish Farm Accountancy Data
Network (FADN) is used to simulate the costs and dispersion of IST compensation. The optimal
behaviour of farmers under the IST is analysed and compared to the recorded performance of
FADN farms.
Dublin – 123rd EAAE Seminar
Price Volatility and Farm Income Stabilisation
Modelling Outcomes and Assessing Market and Policy Based Responses
Page 3 of 12
2. THE CURRENT AND FUTURE RISK MANAGEMENT TOOLS IN FINLAND AND
INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS
2.1. The CDC programme in Finland
The main characteristics of the Finnish Crop Damage Compensation (CDC) programme
are similar to those in the traditional multi-peril crop insurance. A farmer is entitled to crop
damage compensation (an indemnity payment) if the whole farm yield is damaged to the extent
that it is at least 30% below the corresponding regional reference yield. The reference yield is
the regional average yield confirmed annually by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The
programme only compensates quantity losses that exceed the 30% threshold, and average
producer prices are used to determine the monetary amount of compensation. Losses are
monitored on the farm. Regarding quantity losses, the coverage of the indemnity payments is
100%, because all losses exceeding the 30% threshold are compensated. Nevertheless, with
regards to quality losses, the coverage is zero, as the losses due to reduced quality are not
compensated at all. As a result, the true protection level (usually referred as the coverage) is
lower for high performance (yield & quality) farmers than for low performance farmers (Myyrä
and Pietola, 2011).
2.2. The structure of the Income Stabilisation Tool
Under the IST a farmer would be eligible for payments after a loss of greater than 30%
relative to the Olympic average of the farm’s historical income measured by the profit margin.
The income reference, i.e. Olympic average income, is determined by calculating the five-year
average of the income without the highest and lowest values. This calculation creates the
reference margin that is compared to the annual profit margin. According to the European
Commission proposition (EC, 2011), 70% of the losses that are below the 30% limit are
covered. The procedures for negative margins are not mentioned in the European Commission
proposition (Figure 1). The profit margin is the sum of revenues the farmers receive from the
market, including public support and deducting input costs from agricultural production. These
definitions for the reference margin and profit margin are applied throughout this paper. The
costs of the IST scheme are to be covered by the state (65%) and farmers (35%).
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Figure 1. The structure and cost sharing of the IST tool introduced in the CAP 2013
reform













*) In our descriptive statistics it is assumed that the IST also covers negative margins. When a producer has a
negative net margin and the annual profit margin shows a greater than 30% loss compared to the reference margin,
the producer is eligible for compensation.
2.3. WTO commitments
The IST introduced for farmers in the EU is structured to be compatible with WTO
commitments. A similar programme to the IST is being used as income safety net for farmers,
for example, in Canada. Canadian agriculture has a long history of IST programmes (Schmitz,
2008). Despite the similarities, the construction of the Canadian income stabilization tool differs
from that introduced in the EU. The current IST programme in Canada is called AgriStability.
In the AgriStability programme, payments are triggered when a producer’s programme year
profit margin falls below 85% of the average reference margin. The average reference margin is
calculated as the Olympic average from the five previous years, just as in the EU IST. The
government share of the programme expenses is 70% when the programme year margin is 70–
85%, and 80% when the producer’s margin falls below 70% of the average. The AgriStability
programme also covers negative margins. When a producer has a negative net margin, 60% of
the losses are covered (Antón et al., 2011).
The Canadian AgriStability programme is not categorized as green box support under the
WTO’s Uruguay agreement. In the WTO Uruguay agreement, agricultural support payments are
categorized into green, blue and amber boxes. Payments that fall into the green box are
classified as non-trade distorting support. If payments from the IST programme are categorized
into the green box, farmers can receive payments when their annual income falls below 30% of
their average income. The Uruguay round agreement restricts government payments to 70% of
the loss compared to the average income. The average income should be based on the previous
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three years, or if possible on a five-year period excluding the biggest and lowest values, i.e. the
Olympic average. In addition, IST payments should not be connected to production volumes,
prices or factors of production (WTO, 1994). No agreements in the WTO Doha Round should
bring changes to the rules applied in IST programmes (WTO, 2008).
If these above-mentioned conditions are not met, government support is calculated under
the so-called amber box. The total amount of support in the amber box is constrained by the de
minimis percent. In developed countries, the maximum amount of amber support is 5% of the
total or product-specific value of agricultural production.
In the AgriStability programme, the low limit for compensation eligibility and high
compensation rates increase the welfare of farmers who participate in the programme. Schaufele
et al. (2010) estimated that the AgriStability programme increases cow-calf producers’ expected
benefits by some 12%. Kimura and Antón (2011) suggested that AgriStability is a socially more
acceptable form of support to farmers than fixed income supports such as single farm payments
in the EU. Using IST programme in the EU as a form of income support to farmers is also
possible. However, it should be taken into account that increasing the government support in the
IST programme would increase the amount of the EU’s overall amber box support. This limits
the possibility of national governments to use the IST programme as a new form of agricultural
support. The transfer efficiency of IST programmes is also weak. According to Rude and Ker
(2010), the Canadian AgriStability programme has a transfer efficiency of only 39%. Their
results suggest that a major part of the programme payments are transferred to agricultural input
suppliers.
3. METHODS
This paper analyses the use of the IST and compares it to the current CDC scheme in
Finland. The Finnish Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) is used first to describe and
then to simulate the costs of the IST and dispersion of IST compensation payments in Finland.
The dataset includes some 1000 farm operators per year from 1998 to 2009. Special attention is
paid to pig farms and their possibilities to manipulate the IST. This type of manipulation is well
recognized in yield insurances and is generally referred to as a moral hazard problem
(Chambers, 1989). The methods used aim to reveal whether the IST give incentives to amplify
income waivers instead of its original purpose to smooth them as a result of attempts by farmers
to raise their mean income over time. This type of opportunistic behaviour, where farmers
merely change the timing of their output sales and input purchases, is not as well recognized as
risk increasing behaviour in farmers in yield insurance contracts (Smith and Goodwin, 1996;
Roberts et al., 2006).
4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
First we conducted a static analysis of hit rates and possible indemnity payments for static
implementation of the IST to Finnish FADN data. This implementation does not count any
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adjustment of farmers to IST rules. It also assumes that the IST is 100% up taken by the
farmers. These assumptions make the IST and CDC comparable, since the CDC scheme is
openly accessible and full funded by the Finnish government. The data used covered the years
1998–2009. Attention was mainly paid to hit rates and the total costs of the programme. The hit
rate describes the proportion of farmers compensated by the programme. The costs of the
programme are the sum of indemnity payments. Programmes were assumed to be fairly priced,
and the sum of insurance payments thus equals the out-paid indemnity payments. Transaction
costs and the division of costs between farmers and the government were not studied. The static
approach takes the first part of our analysis on a completely different track to the mainstream of
research related to farmers’ safety nets against adverse weather events and commodity price
waivers. The mainstream of research has concentrated on the demand for and uptake of
insurances by farmers (Goodwin and Rejesus, 2008). We currently have no estimates of
farmers’ willingness to purchase insurance contracts such as the IST.
The descriptive statistics here start with statistics on the current variation in farm
income. The profit margin is measured using performance-based counts so that sales of
the products are connected to the years when the products are produced. The input
purchase costs are also connected to those years when the inputs are used in production.
The calculations are based on Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) standards. The
implementation of these standards is time-consuming and significantly costly. For
example, the time lag from current to readily calculated FADN results is approximately
two years1.
These statistics are a clean starting point, because they do not include any
farmers’ actions aimed at income manipulation. Incomes do vary naturally because of
weather conditions, price and subsidy waivers and changes in farm productivity and the
scale of production.
5. LINEAR PROGRAMMING TO REVEAL FARMERS’ ACTIONS
Linear programming was used to map the possibilities of farmers to adjust the reference
margin, which is the basis for IST compensation, to maximize their farm incomes in the long
term. The realized profit in year t is measured as follows:
= + + + ( )
πt = realized profit
pmt = profit margin in year n
1See, for example, www.mtt.fi/economydoctor
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At = annual adjustment possibility for the profit margin
ISTt = indemnity payment from IST
IST(C)t = cost of participating in the IST
Finnish farms are taxed on the cash-based annual income statement. It is most likely that
implementation of the IST would be based on taxed incomes. It is known that Finnish farmers
are able to adjust their taxed annual income to smooth income waivers. They cannot change
their income level in the long term, but annual output sales and input purchases could be
adjusted by changing their timing. These endogenous choices build the annual adjustment
possibility At. This is already used to smooth annual changes in taxed incomes. However, At
could be also used as a trampoline mechanism to induce larger variation in annual profit
margins and thus to manipulate the Olympic average. This would, of course, affect indemnity
payments from the IST and farmers’ profits over time. In our analysis we tested what would
happen if the average pig farmers in Finland had the possibility to use At optimally over the





At+ At+1+ At+2=[-€2500 … 2500]At+... + At+11=0.
In the studied scenario, the annual adjustment possibility is within the limits of ±€5000
and the sum of adjustment in 3 successive years is within the limits of ±€2500. The argument
against this study setup is of course that farm-based monitoring will be implemented to test
whether the cash-based income statement is in line with performance-based counts, where input
purchases and output sales are connected to those years when they occurred in real life.
However, imperfect information is a problem and farmers have a considerable information
advantage here. It would be time consuming and very expensive for state officials to judge
every single input purchase and output sale on a farm. In the Canadian AgriStability
programme, producers are obliged to provide information on commodity and input stock levels
in order to participate in the programme. The administrative costs of the AgriStability
programme are not known, but the Auditor General of Canada (2011) has criticised
AgriStability because of its large administrative burden and complexity.
6. RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
The annual average of the profit margin varied on Finnish bookkeeping farms between
€10 260 and€37 465 per year. The highest profit margin in average terms was obtained in 2007
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and the lowest in 1998. The variation in profit margins is large, since the average profit margin
in the best years has been almost quadruple that of the worst years. Large variation between
farms does not explain inter-annual variation in the sample, since the group of FADN farms has
remained almost constant over time (Table 1).
At the farm level, harsh climate conditions do not give possibilities for the diversification
of production. There are simply not as many plant species to choose between as in more
favourable areas. The other main feature is that the commodity yields and prices move
independently. Thus, no natural hedge on commodity markets exists to secure farmer incomes,
as in larger countries whose yields and yield expectations affect prices on world markets. The
coefficient of variation for farm income at the farm level was on average terms 2.11. The
observed variation is significantly larger than the measured variability in the per hectare
revenues from crops in more favourable EU areas (OECD 2011).
Table 1: Profit margin without CDC compensation, 1989–2009
Year Mean SD Q1 Q3
1998 10 260 22 737 -2579 18 571
1999 12 222 27 004 -3044 20 125
2000 20 985 30 046 2290 32 777
2001 22 982 37 436 1345 33 222
2002 14 357 32 123 -4081 27 511
2003 14 011 33 804 -5246 27 277
2004 14 656 34 082 -4278 27 975
2005 16 090 38 036 -4895 30 611
2006 21 360 43 634 -3950 38 807
2007 37 465 52 879 3214 57 909
2008 35 825 54 193 1873 55 384
2009 29 743 56 155 -3515 45 699
Source: own elaboration
Nominal prices. SD = standard deviation; Q1 = lower quartile (approximately 25% of the values lie below Q1); Q3 =
upper quartile (approximately 75% of the values lie below Q3)
Large variation in the profit margin is due to weather shocks and price volatility. Because
of the lack of a natural hedge mechanism in Finland, these variables amplify farm income
variability. Comparison of CDC and IST schemes gives tools to compare the size of the effects
of these variables. Table 2 lists the realised CDC and estimated IST hit rates and the sum of
realised CDC and estimated IST compensation in 1998–2009. The CDC scheme only covers
weather-based crop damage exceeding 30% deductible from the regional average. The results
indicate that crop damage this large is reasonably systemic and has occurred to a large extent in
particular years. Examples include 1998 and 1999, when on average one out of four farms faced
crop damage this extensive. Unfortunately, our FADN data do not cover these years to
implement the IST appropriately. IST compensation is based on a five-year average, excluding
the worst and the best years. Consequently, the IST results provided in Table 2 are only reliable
from 2003 onwards.
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The hit rates were studied at the farm level. Each farm was entered into the IST scheme
and possible indemnity payments were calculated. The total sum of compensation was
calculated by weighting FADN farms to represent the total farm population in Finland.
Weighting was carried out on the farm level. The results clearly indicate that the IST scheme is
much larger than the CDC scheme. This is expected, since the IST also covers the price waivers,
and it appears that price waivers have a larger effect on farm income than pure yield damage
compensated through the CDC scheme.
Table 2: CDC and IST compensation, 1989–2009
Year







1998 24.9 11.6 0 0
1999 19.2 18.9 26.4 45.7
2000 0.6 0.6 13.0 24.1
2001 1.1 0.7 18.6 34.0
2002 1.1 1.9 37.7 118.4
2003 4.5 2.2 40.1 135.3
2004 6.0 9.4 35.5 116.7
2005 0.7 1.1 31.6 99.7
2006 5.5 4.0 23.8 59.1
2007 0.5 1.7 10.9 24.7
2008 0.9 2.1 21.8 87.6
2009 0.4 N.A. 36.9 N.A.
Source: own elaboration
The IST scheme has been triggered with a high frequency on Finnish farms. For example,
in 2003 about 40% of farms triggered the IST payment. Even with the high grain prices and
normal yields in 2007, one out of ten farms triggered the IST payment. This indicates that
Finnish farmers have been operating in an economic environment where “normal risks” are
large enough to trigger the IST. In the Canadian AgriStability programme, payments are more
easily triggered, just after 15% deductible. If this low deductible was also implemented in
Finland, it would lead to only a slight increase in the hit rate and the sum of compensation
payments, because the variation in farm incomes is so large.
Linear programming to reveal farmers’ actions
To predict farmers’ actions under the IST, the average pig farm was studied. The results
indicate that the use of the annual adjustment possibility for the profit margin would have
increased farmers’ profits under IST in 1998–2009. The net profit would have increased even
when using small annual adjustment quantities that sum up to zero over time.
When a pig farmer maximises the profits under the IST, it is profitable to adjust the
economic result of the weakest years to be even weaker. It is also profitable to reduce the
economic results in years with the highest profits to the limit at which these years are “dropped”
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in the reference margin calculation. This builds up the adjustment capacity to increase the
profits in those years that are used to calculate the reference margin (Table 3). A high reference
margin could be considered as a stock or buffer to be realised in bad years (Table 3).
In the pig farm case, individual farmers received payments from the IST totalling€16 889
during 1998–2009. IST payments were triggered in 2003 and 2008. In 2003 the IST payment
was€10 395 and in 2008€6494. The farmer’s overall profit margin increased from€470 905 to
€485 333. The profit margins of these years before adjustment are well below the reference
margin, and the farmer’s actions increase the IST payments. The obtained results reveal that
there is a clear incentive for moral hazard in the IST. Farmers could easily manipulate their
economic results merely through the timing of their input purchases and output sales. The
adjustment capability of 10% of the annual profit margin makes farmers net receivers from the
IST. Profits summed from 1998–2009 increase by €14 428. Thus, the net costs from the IST
would become negative. However, the IST manages to smooth income waivers (Table 3).











payment - IST cost
reference
margin
1998 22 700 -2 500 20 200 0 132 20 067
1999 34 234 5 000 39 234 0 205 39 029 20 200
2000 52 990 -4 105 48 885 0 242 48 643 29 717
2001 47 280 1 605 48 885 0 242 48 643 36 106
2002 35 488 5 000 40 488 0 210 40 278 45 668
2003 20 158 -5 000 15 158 10 395 113 25 440 42 869
2004 40 529 2 500 43 029 0 220 42 809 42 869
2005 36 509 0 36 509 0 195 36 314 44 134
2006 36 939 0 36 939 0 196 36 314 40 008
2007 62 176 2 500 64 676 0 302 64 373 37 978
2008 22 901 -5 000 17 901 6 494 123 24 271 38 825
2009 59 003 0 59 003 0 281 58 723 38 825
∑ 1998-
2009 470 905 0 16 889 2 461 485 333
Source: own elaboration
1Farmers pay a basic payment of€55 and 85% of 0.45%* adjusted profit margin. This structure is similar to that in
the Canadian AgriStability programme. However, the calculated costs do not cover 35% of the overall IST costs
under Finnish conditions.
The trampoline effect comes from the rule of thumb for the farmer. When insured by the
IST, farmers should always try to manipulate their profit margin downwards in below-average
years. In the best years, the adjustment capacity should be built up, but these years should
remain dropped from the calculation of the reference margin. When confronted with a really
large drop in the profit margin, farmers should take their money out of the IST. The extreme
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case where profit margins are constant over time gives a more general hint. With constant profit
margins over time, insured farmers could never receive IST payments in the form of indemnity
payments.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Farmers have formal and informal measures to smooth income waivers. These tools
typically become mixed under yield and income insurance schemes such as the IST. The basis
for farmers’ actions is an attempt at profit maximization in the long term. Farmers have more
information about individual farm incomes than the state officials running the IST. By using this
advanced information, farmers insured under the IST could obtain some cover against income
waivers for free.
The IST is designed to smooth income waivers. Indemnity payments are triggered only if
the profit margin drops enough on an individual farm. This does not leave room for farmers’
informal measures to smooth income waivers, but encourages the opposite behaviour. Our
results show that the income variation is large on Finnish farms. When comparing the current
CDC scheme and the IST, it seems that the smaller part of the variation comes from yield
variation and the larger part from the price volatility. Thus, farmers also need other possibilities
than yield insurances to prepare them against income volatility.
From the farmers’ point of view, the IST provides possibilities to smooth income
variability, while it also increases the mean income. However, the farmer must first amplify the
income waivers by timing the input purchases and output sales. This trampoline effect shakes
the benefits for the farmer from the IST.
As shown with the linear programming model, farmers could use the IST as an income
transfer policy rather than an effective risk management tool. However, the efficiency of the IST
as an income transfer policy is questionable due to its large transaction costs. It is evident that
before the IST is applied in Finland, it will be important to reveal the moral hazard linked to the
risk management tool. Thus, more research is needed on attitudes among Finnish farmers
towards risk and risk management tools.
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